This paper examines whether labor law reform in Taiwan depressed female earnings and employment during the 1980s. The new provisions regulating working hours and providing maternity benefits raise the relative cost of employing women. We use a simple competitive labor market model to measure the impact of the protective measures on female employment, wages, and hours worked.
I. Introduction
Many developing country governments have intervened in their labor markets by implementing special regulations to protect women, particularly maternity benefits and limits on working hours. However, these protective measures often raise the cost of hiring women, leading firms to lower women's wages, hire fewer women, and hire women to perform only part-time or subcontract work with no benefits. While few studies have actually calculated such costs, ignoring the negative effects of protective labor standards may prove harmful for women in those countries currently experiencing structural transformation and an increase in female labor force participation.
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For instance, most of the Asian NICs have adopted International Labour Organization (ILO) standards such as maternity leave and female working-hour restrictions in the course of their rapid industrialization. These protective measures may have contributed to low and stagnant female-male earnings ratios in the face of strong economic growth. In an earlier study, Zveglich, Rodgers, and Rodgers (1995) show that, despite female gains in education and experience and a decline in the economy's overall level of wage inequality, between 1978 and 1992 Taiwan's mean gender earnings ratio remained flat at 65 percent. Since observable productivity measures account for a decreasing proportion of the gender earnings gap, the authors look to unmeasured gender-specific factors to explain the persistence of the gap. Institutional changes, such as the adoption of protective labor standards, may be an important part of the story.
In this article we examine whether the 1984 Labor Standards Law in Taiwan might have depressed women's relative earnings and had other negative effects on women's employment during the 1980s. The new standards contain provisions on working hours and maternity benefits that raise the relative cost of employing women, especially younger women. Three years after the government enacted the law, they set up the agency in charge of enforcement. Although Taiwan already had over one hundred labor regulations on the books, enforcement was often inadequate or nonexistent.
Hence creating a viable enforcement structure set the new Labor Law apart from previous regulations and may have given employers a strong incentive to adjust wages and the composition of their workforce.
After giving an overview of the protective measures in the Labor Law, we use a simple competitive labor market model to predict the impact of the protective measures on labor market equilibrium. We then test the predictions using repeated cross-sections of household survey data to estimate a system of equations for employment, earnings, and hours worked using a polychotomous choice model with selectivity. To quantify the effects of the protective measures, the estimation is structured as a natural experiment that exploits the Law's differential coverage across industrial sectors. In this manner, the study contributes to the rapidly growing literature using natural experiments to analyze labor-market policy changes. Results indicate that enforcement of the Labor 2 Law's working-hour provisions had a dampening effect on women's employment and hours worked, and enforcement of the maternity benefits led to a reduction in young women's wages. We end the study with a policy simulation which shows that the protective measures caused women's earnings to grow more slowly than they would have without the policy. This finding is important for other developing countries as they reform their labor codes following ILO standards and Asian examples.
II. The Labor Standards Law: Historical and International Perspective
In 1984 the government enacted the Labor Standards Law, the first comprehensive labor law since Taiwan's industrialization. While the law represents a significant institutional change, legal 3 precedents and existing international standards contributed to the design of the new law. At the national level, Taiwan had more than one hundred labor regulations in effect, many of which the government enacted while the island was still a Japanese colony. The main piece of legislation, the Factory Act, was limited to factories using mechanical power and employing at least thirty workers.
At the international level, the Republic of China was a member of the ILO from 1919 to 1971, ratifying thirty-seven conventions during that period. However, domestic enforcement of the labor 4 regulations, both national legislation and international standards, was often inadequate or nonexistent (BLS, 1972) . The new Labor Standards Law aimed to increase compliance by unifying the various regulations, and coverage expanded to include all enterprises, regardless of size, in agriculture, industry, and some services. As a result, the Labor Law is broader in scope but has many features 5 taken from the old laws. The first three columns of Table 1 compare protective measures for female workers included in the Labor Standards Law with those in the ILO standards and the Factory Act.
Articles aimed specifically at women include working-hour restrictions, maternity benefits provisions, and an equal treatment clause.
Two protective measures in the Labor Law apply to the working hours of women: a night work prohibition and an overtime limit. The Labor Law prohibits women from working between ten in the evening and six in the morning unless the firm acquires special permission and several other conditions hold. The law allows exceptions for some occupations including managerial, technical, and health. Although the restricted hours are the same as the Factory Act, the old law did not provide for any occupational exceptions. The Labor Law is also less restrictive than the ILO standard (ILO Conv. 89) which calls for eleven consecutive hours of rest at night. Violation of this article is punishable by imprisonment and/or fines. As for the overtime limits, women's overtime cannot exceed two hours per day or 24 hours in a given month. These limits are lower than the ceiling for male workers by one hour per day and 22 hours per month. This cap is more restrictive than under the Factory Act which had the same limits on overtime for both men and women.
One feature of the Labor Law that directly affects the cost of employing women, particularly young women, is maternity leave. The law requires firms to grant female workers maternity leave of a combined eight weeks before and after childbirth (four for a miscarriage). Women receive full pay during their leave if their tenure exceeds six months and half pay otherwise. Employers must give pregnant women lighter work without a reduction in pay if requested, and new mothers are entitled to take two paid half-hour breaks daily to breast feed throughout the first year after birth.
Furthermore, an employer may not dismiss a worker during her maternity leave. Employers violating the maternity clauses are subject to fine. The Factory Act had the same duration and pay structure for childbirth but not the miscarriage leave, nursing breaks, or employment guarantee of the new law.
So for workers covered under the old law, the biggest innovation is the employment guarantee.
Maternity provisions in the Labor Law meet most of the ILO standards (ILO Conv. 103) despite the fact that the government never ratified the convention.
In contrast to the articles treating male and female workers differently, one clause in the law attempts to promote equality. The Labor Law prohibits gender wage discrimination for equal work of equal efficiency. This is consistent with a similar clause from the Factory Act and the ILO convention ratified by the government (ILO Conv. 100). Unlike the Factory Act, the new law includes fines for employers who breach this clause, though it does not mention any compensation to the employee for back wages. This type of legislation, which does not affect the hiring and firing practices of employers, probably has little impact on discrimination. As Goldin (1990, p. 201 ) notes for the U.S., "Given the extreme segregation of occupations across the entire economy, particularly across firms, an act that guarantees 'equal pay for equal work' within firms can have little impact on differences in occupations and earnings between men and women." Although Taiwan had ratified the ILO convention on equality of treatment in employment and occupation (ILO Conv. 111), the Labor Law contains no conditions supporting this principle. However, the new law does drop the restrictions contained in the Factory Act that prevent women from entering certain occupations deemed too strenuous or dangerous. Overall, the requirement of "equal pay for equal work" has probably had less of an impact on the labor market than the working hour and maternity benefits provisions.
How does Taiwan's Labor Law compare with other countries in the region? Table 1 also shows protective measures for female workers during the mid-1980s in the three other Asian NICs and Japan. While the coverage differs somewhat, Taiwan's restrictions on working hours for women are comparable to Japan and Hong Kong, particularly with respect to the night work prohibition. South Korea's restrictions are more severe in that they contain no occupational exceptions. Only Singapore does not place any working-hour restrictions on women. Maternity benefits in Taiwan are nearly identical to those in Korea and similar to those in Singapore. The duration of leave is longer in Japan and Hong Kong but with a commensurate reduction in compensation. Regarding the equal opportunity measures, Singapore and Hong Kong do not even stipulate equal pay for equal work; while, on the other hand, Japan and Korea go the next step by officially urging or requiring firms to equalize opportunities in recruitment, job placement, and promotion. However, it is not clear how successfully authorities have enforced equal employment opportunity provisions in Japan and Korea. 6 Overall, Taiwan's labor regulations seem to be on par with others in the region.
Of course, the creation of a new law means little without adequate enforcement. In the past, many of Taiwan's labor laws were poorly enforced or simply ignored. For example, the Mining Act expressly forbid women from working underground, yet women frequently engaged in such work.
One reason for the poor record on compliance observed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (1972, p. 32) was "a lack of a single strong national department with authority and staff to enforce legislation."
In fact, the Labor Law itself originally suffered from the same oversight. Winn (1987, p. 51) 
notes,
One of the greatest shortcomings of the [Labor Standards Law] is that its guarantees remain largely formal. The official policy encourages voluntary compliance by management. Enforcement staff are too few to effectively police the large number of small manufacturing firms in Taiwan, and penalties for violations are too light to intimidate recalcitrant employers.
Three years after the promulgation of the Labor Law, the government took action to remedy the enforcement shortcoming. In 1987, Taiwan established the cabinet-level Council of Labor Affairs (CLA) to enforce the new law. Since the Labor Law was more of a legal reform than an innovation, 7 creating the enforcement structure may have had a more significant impact on the labor market than the enactment of the law itself. The timing of the enactment and enforcement of the Labor Law provide us with an interesting question: Did the creation of a strong enforcement structure lead firms to adjust the composition of their workers, or the level of wages, to minimize the incremental cost of the protective measures in the Labor Law?
III. Methodology
To predict the effects of the protective measures in sectors covered by the legal reform, we use a simple competitive labor market model for women. Suppose the initial equilibrium is one with no restrictions on the working hours of women or any rigidities in the adjustment of wages. Now consider the effect of overtime limits and night work prohibitions on the demand and supply for female workers. Since firms now have less flexibility in the employment of women, they will substitute away from female workers causing the demand for these workers to shift inward. On the supply side, since the initial supply schedule was determined by individual workers maximizing utility without constraints on the time at which they worked, the night work restriction will cause women to supply less labor for a given wage if the new restriction is binding. The overtime limits, on the other hand, will only affect the equilibrium supply if the representative worker is working the maximum allowable hours. Regardless of whether overtime limits are binding, the effect of the working-hour restrictions on the equilibrium wage is indeterminate. The equilibrium quantity of labor, however, declines unambiguously.
In contrast to the working-hour restrictions, which operate mainly through quantity adjustments, maternity benefits will lead to price adjustments. Because maternity benefits are paid by the firm, they act as a tax on the employment of women. Therefore, the demand for the labor of the affected group shifts down by the expected value of the benefit for any quantity of labor.
However, Summers (1989) notes that if workers also value the benefit, they will accept a lower wage for a given quantity of labor supplied; in other words, the supply schedule will shift down. If employees value these benefits by the same amount as employers, the net effect on the equilibrium quantity of labor will be zero. If there are imperfections in the market for maternity benefits, it is possible that the supply schedule shifts down by more than the demand curve since more women may decide to work in order to receive these benefits. Moreover, women who are currently employed may supply more labor for a given wage since the level of maternity benefits is based on monthly earnings. The result then is an unambiguous decline in the equilibrium wage and an indeterminate change in the equilibrium quantity of labor.
The previous analysis assumes that wages are free to adjust to the policy changes. However, the equal pay clause may limit a firm's ability to adjust female wages relative to their male counterparts. Consider again the case of the employer-mandated maternity benefits. Suppose now that firms cannot adjust female wages below a certain level. This level may lie above or below the
initial wage since employers may have some latitude to adjust average wages by shifting women into lower paying occupations, although in principle the equal pay clause should cause firms to increase or maintain female wages for a given quantity of labor. Because the new female labor market equilibrium will be determined by the intersection of the demand curve with the wage constraint, the equilibrium quantity of labor will now decline unambiguously. Therefore, an increase in the equilibrium quantity of labor beyond the initial level implies that the clause is not binding. This then gives us a test of the effectiveness of the equal pay clause.
The goal of our empirical exercise is to quantify the change in female employment, earnings, and hours worked due to the legal reform. In particular, the study compares the changes occurring before and after the establishment of the enforcement agency, and it takes advantage of the differential coverage across industrial sectors to isolate the Labor Law effects from other contemporaneous shocks. The analysis begins by dividing workers into four demographic groups by age (young, mature) and gender (male, female). These groups are then subdivided by industrial sector according to Labor Law coverage (covered, uncovered) . Within this structure, we can model the change in a group-specific labor-market outcome (employment, earnings, or hours worked) for each sector as a series of shocks. Let Z(d,s,t) represent some labor-market outcome for demographic group d in sector s at time t and ) Z (d,s,t) the change from the previous period. The change in the t outcome over time can then be written as defining the shocks such that 0 affects all workers within a given sector, 0 affects only mature 1 2 workers, 0 affects only female workers, and 0 affects only young female workers. M is a dummy 3 4 variable equal to one if the individual is mature, and F is a dummy variable equal to one if the
individual is female. As for the Labor Law provisions, 0 incorporates the working-hour restrictions, 3 including the allowance of occupational exceptions to some regulations. The 0 term encompasses 4 the effect of the maternity benefits. For the earnings equation, both of these will also include the effects of the equal pay clause.
Since the shocks within a given sector may also include relative changes not associated with the law, we difference the shocks across two sectors which vary only in terms of their Labor Law coverage. Denote these differences-in-differences (DD) estimators as:
where ) denotes covered sector minus uncovered sector. Figure 1 in the DD estimators for mature males and mature females. Solving for the effect of the maternity benefits, ) 0 , is a bit more complicated. We must first difference across age groups (young minus s 4 mature) for both sexes to remove the gender effects and then difference the results (female minus male). These estimates correspond to what Gruber (1994) calls differences-in-differences-indifferences (DDD) estimators. We use two assumptions to identify the system. First, the change in labor-market outcomes of young and mature males differs only by the age effect. This allows the sector specific shocks to be identified. Second, there is no shock affecting the relative outcomes of the two sectors, with respect to gender, concurrent with the institutional changes. This restriction just requires sector-specific shocks not associated with the law to affect workers in the same way regardless of sex (i.e., only through ) 0 and ) 0 ).
A potential source of bias in the evaluation of the Labor Law effects is that the choice of covered industries is nonrandom. If policy placement is correlated with unobservable sector-specific factors, the estimated coefficients on the policy variables using cross-sectional data will be subject to endogeneity bias. For example, if industries are covered by the law because they tend to have 8 women work long hours or are less likely to provide for maternity, then using the variation across industries at a single point in time will give biased estimates of program effects. In this scenario, the effect would be to understate the impact of the Labor Law. However, if industries are covered because they lack the political clout to avoid the restrictions, then the direction of the bias depends on the correlation between "political clout" and the behavior the regulations aim to control. While the protective measures themselves are unlikely to be endogenous since they represent only one aspect of a comprehensive legal reform, we will control for any effect on levels using a sector fixedeffect term.
We formalize the DDD estimation strategy in a model of industry choice to control for relative changes in productivity characteristics across sector-demographic groups and to control for possible sample-selection bias. The model is an extension of the three-stage procedure outlined in Killingsworth (1983) for estimating an overidentified labor supply function. We modify the original formulation to include the polychotomous choice aspects of Trost and Lee (1984) and Lee (1983) .
The earnings and working hours for an individual are observed only for the industrial sector which they actually select. Since the choice of industrial sector may be correlated with the unobserved determinants of earnings or labor supply, the first stage is to estimate the probability of sector participation, over the entire sample of workers and nonworkers, using a multinomial logit. The dependent variable, S, is a categorical variable indicating industrial sector choice (0 if
"Nonparticipant", 1 if "Uncovered", and 2 if "Covered"). Omitting the time and demographic subscripts for simplicity, the multinomial logit estimates a set of coefficients such that where X is a set of exogenous variables and T1 and T2 are time indicator variables for the Post-Law and Post-CLA periods. Evaluating the derivative of the estimated probabilities with respect to the time indicators at the variable means and subtracting across sectors gives us the DD estimators for employment. Taking the predicted probabilities from the first stage, we construct a set of sampleselection terms as follows:
where f(@) and F(@) are the density and cumulative distribution functions for the standard normal.
These terms are analogous to the inverse Mills' ratio in the Heckman selection model.
The second stage is to estimate a human capital earnings function, using the subsample of workers, including the selection terms from the first stage. Pooling the data for both sectors, the earnings equation can be written as where e is log monthly earnings, X is a set of explanatory variables, including the sample-selection * terms and log monthly working hours, C is a dummy variable equal to one of the worker is employed in the covered sector, and u is a white noise error term. The DD estimators for earnings are just the coefficients on the interaction terms. We use the estimated earnings function to calculate a predicted
wage, net of the sample selection effects, by taking the fitted value for earnings at one hour of work (or zero log monthly hours) and zero values for the sample-selection terms. We then use the predicted wage from stage two and the sample-selection terms from the first stage in the final stage.
This is the instrumental variables estimation of the hours worked function, a structural labor supply function. Again using only the subsample of workers, the labor supply function can be written as where h is log monthly hours worked, X is the set of explanatory variables, including the estimated ** wage and sample-selection terms, and v is a white noise error term. As in the earnings equation, the DD estimators are the coefficents on the interaction terms. Once the model is estimated for the four demographic groups, the Labor Law effects are calculated by making the appropriate differences across DD estimators.
To identify the sample-selection effects, we omit at least one variable in X from X and X . * **
The identifying variables depend on the demographic group. All groups include a dummy variable for a business owner within the household. The young groups also include a dummy variable for school as the major activity within the reference week, and the female groups include a dummy for housework as the major activity. While family background variables are commonly used as 9 identifiers in selection equations, the data do not contain sufficient information on the individuals to construct such variables. Furthermore to identify the wage effects, we omit at least on variable from the earnings function in the estimation of the labor supply equation. Following the convention in the labor literature, we exclude the experience variables from the estimation of the labor supply function to instrument for the wage. Appendix Tables 1 and 2 list the variable means by demographic group   10 for the full sample and the subsample of workers. Variables for the observable characteristics common to multiple equations are: a set of binary variables for education and major, potential experience and its square, enterprise-specific tenure and its square; a set of industry dummies, percent female within an occupation, and a binary variable for supervisor status; and location dummies, an urban dummy, and binary variables for marital status and married women with preschool-age children. In addition to the sample-selection terms, the functional variables in the earnings equation include log monthly working hours and a dummy for part-time work, and the hours worked function contains a variable for other household income. Since we control for differences in hours worked within the earnings function, the estimated Labor Law effects apply to both earnings and wages.
IV. Data
To test the Law's impact on female employment, wages, and hours worked, this study uses the period before the law was enacted ("Pre-Law") and 1985-1986 data for the period after the law was enacted but before the enforcement structure was put into place ("Post-Law"). To allow enough time for the new agency to be effective, we use 1988-1989 data for the period after the CLA was established ("Post-CLA"). In the earnings and working hours estimations, we include only civilian, non-farm, private-sector paid employees.
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This study categorizes Labor Law coverage according to one-digit Standard Industrial Classification codes. Commerce, Business Services, and Social and Personal Services make up the uncovered industries, and all other industries fall within the covered sector. We define "young" and "mature" workers in a way that isolates the effects of the different provisions of the Labor Law.
Unlike the working-hour restrictions, which apply to all women covered by the law, maternity benefits are an anticipated cost to the firm, the probability of which depends on the fertility rate of the particular demographic group. Table 2 reports fertility rates for women of childbearing age throughout the 1980s. The table shows that women in the 20 to 34 age groups had fertility rates exceeding those of the women in the 35 to 44 age groups by at least a factor of four in every period.
For this reason, this study uses 35 as the dividing line between "young" and "mature" workers. We pool the data across time periods and sectors within demographic groups but estimate the model separately across groups.
To ensure the final sample includes only workers with a higher degree of labor market attachment, we limit our sample to individuals within the 20 to 65 age group. However, using all of the working-age observations in the estimation has two potential sources of bias. First, some observations that would be included in the full sample in some periods would be dropped in others.
For example, individuals who are 20 years old in the Post-Law period would not have met the minimum age requirement in the previous period. Second, some observations that are in one demographic group in one period would be in another demographic group in others. For example, individuals who are 30 years old in 1983 would be in the young group in the Pre-Law period but in the mature group in the Post-CLA period. If the data included the same individuals in every year, we could limit our analysis to those observations which fell in the same demographic group in each period. Since we do not have a true panel, we must follow pseudo-cohorts in our estimations. In this subsample of the working-age population, the young group includes only individuals who would have been age 20 to 28 in 1983 (those in the high-fertility range in every period) and the mature group contains only individuals who would have been age 35 to 59 in 1983.
V. Results
We begin the analysis with a simple difference in means estimate of the Labor Law effects on earnings and working hours. Tables 3 and 4 report DDD estimates of the Labor Law's impact on monthly earnings and on monthly working hours. For each demographic group, the first three columns of the rows labeled Covered and Uncovered report the level of mean log monthly earnings (log monthly hours) in that industrial sector. The last two columns represent the change from the previous period in group-specific earnings (working hours) by sector. These calculations correspond to the terms labeled ) Z in equation (1). Hence the cell with 0.124 in Table 3 indicates an t dst approximate 12.4 percent rise in mean log earnings for young males in the uncovered sector between the Pre-Law and Post-Law periods. In no case did mean real earnings fall over time. The third row for each demographic group measures differences across sectors. Hence the cell marked -0.038 indicates higher mean earnings in the uncovered sector than in the covered sector for young men in the Pre-Law period. Results indicate higher mean earnings in the uncovered sector than in the covered sector across demographic groups and time periods. This finding demonstrates that the uncovered sector, which is made up entirely of services, encompasses more than just low-paying, unskilled jobs.
The last two columns of each row labeled Sector Difference report the sectoral difference in the change from the previous period in group-specific earnings (hours worked). These correspond to the DD estimators, ) ) Z in equation (2). A positive number indicates that the change in mean s t dt earnings (hours worked) from the first to the second period was higher for the covered than the uncovered sector. For monthly earnings, a positive number in these cells indicates convergence in earnings across sectors since average earnings for each demographic group are higher in the uncovered sector in every period. The DD results in Table 3 show a narrowing over time in the earnings differential between the two sectors for male workers, and a widening for female workers.
In other words, male workers generally experienced stronger earnings growth in the covered sector and female workers in the uncovered sector. The DD results for hours worked in Table 4 have a more discernible pattern for age groups than genders. Younger workers experienced a widening, and older workers a narrowing, in the working hours differential between the two sectors after the Law was passed. Following enforcement of the Law, all workers except mature females experienced a stronger increase in hours worked in the covered sector.
The last set of numbers in Tables 3 and 4 give us the DDD estimators of the effects of the Labor Law. Subtracting the DD estimator for mature males from that of mature females isolates ) N , the net earnings (hours worked) penalty or premium from the female working hour restrictions.
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Similarly, subtracting the differential between young and mature males in the DD estimators from the differential between young and mature females isolates ) µ , the earnings (hours worked) penalty for s t maternity benefits. Results in Table 3 indicate an earnings penalty for the working hour restrictions and for maternity benefits, both after the Law was passed and after it was enforced. However, none of the DDD estimators are statistically significant. The results for working hours indicate a strongly negative impact from the working hour restrictions after enforcement but a strongly positive impact for maternity benefits.
Of course, simply looking at the difference in means does not control for compositional changes within the sectors over time. Table 5 presents the estimated Labor Law impact on employment, wages, and hours worked, and Appendix Tables 3-6 present the complete estimates of the system of equations for each demographic group. With respect to the observable characteristics in the Appendix tables, the signs on the coefficients for the functional variables are as expected.
Being a student or housewife reduces the probability of being engaged in paid, private-sector employment as does having a business owner within the household. The negative coefficients on the sample selection terms in the wage equations in most cases imply that low-wage individuals are being selected out of the sample. Individual labor supply responds positively to an increase in the offered wage. Within the education and experience variables, we see that the education-wage profile is positively sloped and somewhat steeper for females than males within each age cohort. Wages increase with experience and tenure but at a decreasing rate for all groups. As for the occupation variables, being in a "female" occupation generally carries an wage penalty while being a supervisor provides a premium. With few exceptions, the coefficients on the observable characteristics are significant at a 95 percent level of confidence. Table 5 shows the direct effects of the Labor Law provisions on employment, wages, and hours worked. Our estimates indicate that the working-hour restrictions caused participation in nonfarm, private-sector paid employment to drop by over 1 percent, with all of this negative effect occurring after enforcement. However, the effect of these provisions on wages is insignificant. The working hour provisions also have a significant negative impact on hours worked, again with all of the negative effect occurring after enforcement. Working hours fell by 8.4 percent after the Labor Law was enforced. The effect on total labor supply, employment times working hours, is a decline of nearly 10 percent in the Post-CLA period. Our results for the night work restrictions and overtime limits are therefore consistent with the predictions of the competitive labor-market model.
Maternity benefits also significantly affect participation, but in the opposite direction:
participation rises by 2.5 percent. As with the working-hour restrictions, only the changes after enforcement are statistically significant. Average wages of young women, on the other hand, show a significant decline of over 6 percent due to maternity benefits once the enforcement structure was put into place. Furthermore, during this same post-CLA period, we see a significant and positive change in hours worked by young women due to the maternity provisions. In fact, the increase in total labor supply exceeds 12 percent, with the bulk of the change being due to increased hours worked. Gruber (1994) notes that the impact of maternity benefits on employment and hours worked is uncertain and depends on such factors as whether firms are able to reduce wages by the full cost of the provision. Our findings show that the cost of maternity benefits are being at least partially borne by the affected group. The timing and magnitude of the results suggests that firms did not adjust wages downward to compensate for the costs of the maternity benefits until they had to, after enforcement. The significant increase in the labor supply of young women is consistent with the story of market imperfections for maternity benefits and suggests that the equal pay clause is not a binding constraint. As with the working-hour restrictions, our results for the effect of mandated maternity benefits fit the predictions of the competitive labor market model.
VI. Policy Simulation
In the previous section, we showed the effect of protective measures in the Labor Law on labor market outcomes, but what has been the net effect on the gender earnings differential? In particular, do the results help to explain why Taiwan's mean gender earnings gap stagnated during the 1980s despite female gains in education and experience? To illustrate the effect of the legal reform, we project the change in the gender earnings differential in the absence of any policy change, holding observable productivity characteristics constant. Then we simulate the likely outcomes of alternative scenarios for policy changes: just the working-hour restrictions, just the maternity benefits, and both provisions together. To focus only on statistically significant effects, we limit our analysis to changes occurring between the Post-Law and Post-CLA periods.
We begin the exercise by defining average earnings by gender as the geometric mean of earnings across age groups and sectors within each gender. Let w and h denote the geometric ijs ijs means of wages and working hours for individuals of gender i, age group j, and industrial sector s.
Then average earnings by gender, , can be written as follows:
where 2 , the weighting factor, is the proportion of employed persons of gender i who are in age ijs group j and sector s. The weights can be written as a function of the probablility of employment in sector s, p , and the size of the total cohort, n , as follows:
Holding the cohort size fixed (i.e., ), we calculate the growth rate of average earnings by differentiating its logarithm with respect to time. This gives us where
The change in the gender earnings gap is just the difference in the growth rate of mean female earnings and mean male earnings. Table 6 reports the parameters used in the policy simulation by demographic group and sector. We calibrate the model using data on levels of the employment rate, average log wage, and average log hours worked from the Post-Law period as the initial values. However, to abstract from changes in the demographic composition of the total population, we use the average cohort size between the Post-Law and Post-CLA periods. Table 6 The figures reported for "Working-Hour Restrictions" allow the covered and uncovered sector outcomes to differ by the effect of the working hour restrictions only. Similarly, figures reported for "Maternity Benefits" allow covered and uncovered sector outcomes to differ by the effect of maternity benefits only. Because men are not affected by the working hour restrictions and maternity benefits, the labor market outcomes in these last two categories are zero. The labor market outcomes for women of the working-hour restrictions and maternity benefits are the statistically significant Labor Law impact results for the Post-CLA period taken from Table 5 . Note that this simulation ignores Labor Law provisions that affect all mature workers differently than young regardless of gender, such as changes in retirement benefits, in order to focus solely on the protective measures for women. Table 7 reports the simulated changes in male and female earnings, and in the gender earnings differential, according to the four alternative scenarios: no policy change, just working-hour restrictions, just maternity benefits, and both provisions together. Because the provisions do not affect men, average male earnings are projected to grow about 12 percent between the Post-Law and Post-CLA periods regardless of the policy change. If there had been no policy change, women's earnings would have grown by less than half the male rate, and the gender earnings gap would have increased by almost 7 percent (independent of productivity changes). While the working-hour restrictions cause female earnings to fall, we see a surprisingly large increase in female earnings due to maternity benefits. This increase is driven by the positive impact of maternity benefits on hours worked. The net effect from both policy provisions is just a small increase in women's earnings, leaving the gender earnings gap to expand by 11.5 percent. This finding helps to explain the substantial growth in the residual earnings gap during the 1980s, which Zveglich, Rodgers, and
Rodgers attribute largely to increased wage discrimination. Although discrimination may still have played a role, we now understand that the protective measures in the Labor Law caused women's residual earnings to grow by less than they would have without the Law. This worked against female gains in education and experience and contributed to the observed stagnation of Taiwan's mean gender earnings gap.
VII. Conclusion
This paper provides support for the hypothesis that protective measures for female workers raise the cost to firms of employing women, providing firms with an incentive to reduce women's labor input or lower their pay. In particular, results from Taiwan indicate a decline in working hours due to enforcement of working-hour regulations but no significant impact on earnings. The increase in cost from firm-subsidized maternity benefits, on the other hand, did lead to a reduction in earnings.
The additional constraint of "equal pay for equal work" does not seem to be binding since we see wages adjusting to the mandated maternity benefits rather than the quantity of labor declining.
Are women in Taiwan better off with these protective labor regulations? This depends largely on how they value the mandates. The working-hour restrictions led to a decline in the amount of labor supplied by individual workers and no reduction in their wages. If the original labor supply curve reflects women's choices that maximized their utility in the absence of labor market restrictions, then one can interpret the impact of the working-hour restrictions as a reduction in utility relative to the prereform equilibrium. As for the maternity provisions, our results suggest that women did value the additional benefits as evidenced by the increase in the equilibrium quantity of labor despite the wage penalty. These results suggest that the market for maternity benefits is imperfect, and women do value the alternative of mandated maternity benefits in the workplace. However, the combined effects of the protective measures in the Labor Law did contribute to a stagnant female-male earnings differential during the 1980s, despite women's gains in educational attainment and a decline in the economy's overall level of wage inequality. Our policy simulation demonstrates that without any policy change, women's earnings would have grown by less then half the male rate (controlling for changes in productivity characteristics), and with the combined policy change, women's earnings grew even more slowly. If policy makers place a large weight on reducing the gender earnings gap while reforming labor market institutions, they must take into account the negative earnings and employment effects of new legislation intended to protect women. Otherwise, ignoring these side effects may lead to regulations which hinder women's progress towards equity in the labor market. 1. An exception is Gruber (1994) which uses U.S. data to calculate the cost of mandated maternity benefits. For developing countries, the World Bank (1995) discusses costs and benefits of different types of labor standards but does not perform a quantitative analysis. Similarly, the United Nations Development Programme devotes its 1995 report to gender issues, including legal reforms, but makes no systematic attempt to quantify the effects of such reforms.
2.
See, for example, Card and Krueger (1994) , Gruber (1994) , Katz and Krueger (1992) , and Card (1992a Card ( , 1992b .
3.
The government promulgated the Labor Standards Law in August 1984 and added the Enforcement Rules for the Labor Standards Law in February 1985. We will refer to these two laws collectively as the "Labor Law" unless otherwise necessary for clarity.
4.
The ILO conventions ratified that deal explicitly with female workers are the following: Convention 45, "Underground Work (Women);" Convention 100, "Equal Remuneration;" Convention 111, "Discrimination (Employment and Occupation);" and Convention 117, "Social Policy (Basic Aims and Standards)." In November of 1971, the members of the ILO voted to recognize the government of the People's Republic of China as the representative for China in response to a similar action by the United Nations in the previous month. As both the PRC and ROC governments claim sovereignty over the whole of China, the representatives of the Republican government withdrew.
5.
The Labor Law covers transportation, warehousing, telecommunications, and mass communication, but excludes all other services. Civil service regulations cover government employees except where the Labor Law is more beneficial to them.
6.
For example, see Edwards (1994) for discussion of enforcement problems with Japan's 1986 Equal Employment Opportunity Law.
7.
The lifting of martial law in July of 1987, and the legalization of strikes accompanying it, coincides with the establishment of the CLA. While increased bargaining power of workers probably helped in enforcing various aspects of the Labor Law, the effect on the measures aimed specifically at women is unclear since the activities of "unofficial unions" are not well documented. For an overview of labor relations following the end of martial law, see Kleingartner and Peng (1991) .
8. Gertler and Molyneux (1994) and Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1986) discuss the issue of endogeneity of program placement with respect to family planning programs.
9.
The survey asks individuals, "What was your main activity in the previous week?" The range of responses include "Attending school" and "Housework" within both the "Working" and "Not Working" sections.
10.
See the survey by Killingsworth and Heckman (1986) for examples.
NOTES

